A Europe-wide pattern is rising: an increasing number of politicians are campaigning on the declare that the monetary burden of the battle in Ukraine is unsustainable. All that is taking place at a decisive second, when Europe should assume full accountability for financing a battle in Ukraine that’s slowly approaching the length of the 2 world wars, as Washington retreats into the background. This, in flip, severely exams the political deal-making abilities of EU leaders – honed for greater than 15 years by Viktor Orbán and his populist counterparts – along with the EU’s authorized frameworks.
At the year-end EU summit on 18–19 December, both an settlement is reached on the assets enabling the financing of the Ukrainian economic system and army operations, or Europe may as soon as once more weaken its defensive place, doing Vladimir Putin’s Russia one other favour.
A key query, because the German authorities has already hinted behind closed doorways in latest days, is whether or not it is going to be doable on the EU summit to make use of authorized manoeuvring to pre-empt a probable veto – primarily based on the Hungarian authorities’s strategy over the previous 4 years to joint Ukraine-related points (a veto that the Slovak authorities can also be part of).
An vital improvement is that on the night of 11 December, ambassadors sitting within the European Council – representing nationwide governments in EU decision-making – introduced that they’d agreed on a revised model of a proposal below Article 122 of the Treaties. The determination was taken by a “very clear majority,” in accordance with Denmark’s Council presidency. This determination makes it unattainable for a member state to carry sanctions in opposition to Russia. Until now, these punitive measures have been prolonged each six months, and every such determination required unanimity among the many member states.
This issues now as a result of the EU intends to supply loans to Ukraine backed by €210 billion in frozen Russian banking belongings. That would develop into unattainable if, as a result of opposition from even a single member state, the sanctions couldn’t be prolonged. In that case, the banking belongings must be returned to Russia, and the collateral for Ukrainian loans would disappear.
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The background to this determination is that on 3 December the European Commission printed its proposals to permit the lawful use of curiosity on seized Russian belongings to finance Ukraine. The Commission’s authorized service outlined viable choices to cowl financing wants for the 2026–2027 interval: joint EU borrowing and a brand new Reparations Loan.
The above-mentioned Council settlement is especially important in gentle of the Hungarian veto, because the Orbán authorities already signalled to the press on 5 December that it formally rejects the European Commission’s choice of issuing widespread eurobonds. Hungary doesn’t help issuing eurobonds to finance a €165 billion mortgage for Ukraine’s help.
All this comes in opposition to the backdrop of up-to-date knowledge from the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, which reveals that Hungary spends comparatively little on supporting Ukraine, regardless of – or maybe exactly due to – the proximity of the battle within the neighbouring nation. This contrasts sharply with the comparatively much less prosperous Baltic states and the Nordics, which shoulder the best burden relative to their GDP. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are additionally exceptionally beneficiant within the “center band,” whereas in absolute phrases Germany and France present probably the most help.
Among worldwide lenders and donors, nevertheless, there’s little debate in regards to the urgency of guaranteeing continued help for Ukraine. In its assertion of 26 November 2025, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) doesn’t mince phrases: “Prompt motion by donors is indispensable to keep away from liquidity strains.”
The IMF additionally stresses that Ukraine’s fiscal and exterior financing wants are massive, and that dangers are “exceptionally excessive” because of the length and depth of the battle and fluctuations in donor help. Meanwhile, the World Bank supplies a concrete determine, estimating Ukraine’s exterior financing wants for 2025 at €37 billion – in different phrases, securing financing from early 2026 onward is pressing.
Fresh figures from the Kiel Institute additionally sound the alarm over the drastic decline in army and defence help in 2025. Ukraine is going through one of many years with the fewest new support selections because the outbreak of the battle in 2022. Europe has allotted solely about €4.2 billion in new army support to Ukraine – far too little to offset the halt in US help, warns the Kiel Institute’s evaluation. At the identical time, disparities inside Europe have widened. France, Germany and the United Kingdom have considerably elevated their allocations, however in relative phrases they nonetheless lag behind the Nordic international locations. By distinction, Italy and Spain have contributed solely minimally.
It can also be price noting that Germany supplies probably the most funding for air-defence programs and tanks, whereas Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states have delivered the most important portions of heavy weapons.
The actuality, nevertheless, is that refugee prices weigh significantly closely on Germany, Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic, although most governments usually account these bills in their very own budgets below “social coverage” and “schooling” strains.
But allow us to take a more in-depth take a look at these monumental sums to realize readability.
How a lot does Ukraine value the EU?
According to an October 2025 overview by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), EU establishments and the 27 member states collectively, as “Team Europe,” have mobilised round €177.5 billion in monetary, army and humanitarian help for Ukraine since February 2022.
This contains macro-financial help and the €50 billion Ukraine Facility for 2024–2027, of which €38.27 billion is direct price range help, primarily via concessional loans. Added to that is army help, which the EPRS estimates at round €63–65 billion when together with member-state deliveries and funds from the European Peace Facility (EPF).
Finally, refugee help is the merchandise that the general public hardly ever associates straight with Ukraine, but primarily based on knowledge from the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, the EPRS estimates EU member states’ refugee-related expenditures at round €155 billion between early 2022 and August 2025.
If every little thing is added collectively – EU price range programmes, army support and refugee prices – Ukraine’s “price ticket” for the EU to date is within the order of €330 billion over 3.5 years. On an annual foundation that is round €90–100 billion, whereas the EU-27’s GDP in 2024 was nicely above €15,000 billion – which means the invoice quantities to roughly 0.6–0.7 share factors of financial output per yr.
EIB and EBRD: the EU’s “improvement wartime economic system”
Beyond basic budgetary objects, it shouldn’t be forgotten that EU monetary establishments are additionally key gamers in financing Ukraine. According to a July 2025 assertion by the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group, because the begin of the Russian invasion it has mobilised €3.6 billion in help and loans for Ukraine – primarily for vitality infrastructure, transport and SME financing.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is Ukraine’s largest institutional investor through the battle: on the 2025 Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome, it reported wartime financing reaching €7.6 billion and goals to take care of an annual degree of €1.5–2 billion.
These figures don’t symbolize “further luxurious investments” however primarily energy crops, bridges, city district-heating programs, border crossings, and the survival of small and medium-sized enterprises – in different phrases, every little thing with out which a frontline nation would shortly develop into a completely unstable, collapsing neighbour.
EU vs. the US: who actually pays for Ukraine’s battle?
The transatlantic “who pays extra?” debate is politically handy, however in accordance with the most recent knowledge Europe has already moved from being a free rider to changing into the principle financier earlier this yr. According to the Kiel Institute, since 2022 EU establishments and member states collectively have dedicated round €165.7 billion in help to Ukraine, whereas the United States has offered about €130.6 billion.
The EPRS additionally highlights that by 2025 Team Europe had overtaken the United States in complete allotted monetary, humanitarian and army help.
In army gear, EU member states have additionally allotted barely extra to Ukraine this yr than Washington: €65.1 billion in contrast with €64.6 billion from the US, alongside an additional €32.8 billion in European pledges.
The image is extra nuanced, nevertheless, as a bigger share of US help consists of grants, whereas round 75% of EU financing takes the type of concessional loans with lengthy grace durations and curiosity subsidies. Admittedly, this implies decrease rapid prices, however the EU assumes larger long-term monetary danger – partly primarily based on the expectation that the loans will in the end be repaid from Russian belongings or “battle reparations loans.”
Which would value extra: a Ukrainian victory or a Russian breakthrough?
Paradoxically, the strongest argument in opposition to the declare that “financing Ukraine is simply too costly” is to stipulate how pricey it could be to not pay.
A latest examine by the Norwegian, civil-funded analytical agency Corisk and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) supplies a transparent framework by evaluating two situations:
Scenario 1 – Russian (partial) victory: Moscow pushes the entrance westward, Ukraine is compelled to simply accept a “dangerous peace” and loses as much as half of its territory. According to the examine, this is able to impose €524–952 billion in refugee and social prices on Europe over 4 years, plus extra defence spending, bringing the entire invoice to €1.2–1.6 trillion.
Scenario 2 – Ukrainian victory: Europe arms Ukraine (1,500–2,500 tanks, 2,000–3,000 artillery programs, as much as 8 million drones, fashionable air defence), enabling it to push again Russian forces and power the Kremlin right into a beneficial peace. Researchers estimate the fee at €522–838 billion over 4 years – roughly half of what Europe would pay within the occasion of a Russian victory.
The examine additionally assumes a diminished function for the United States, which means that the majority of the burden – as right this moment – would fall on Europe.
How a lot would it not value if Russia attacked a NATO member?
There isn’t any direct, official EU calculation of the price of an precise NATO battle, however there are approximate estimates of what European defence would require even within the occasion of a US withdrawal.
According to a 2025 evaluation by the Brussels-based assume tank Bruegel, if Europe needed to deter Russia with out the United States, it would wish not less than 300,000 extra troops and round €250 billion in further defence spending yearly within the coming years.
According to the Norwegian examine cited above, extra defence spending to strengthen NATO’s japanese flank within the occasion of a Russian battle in opposition to NATO would elevate Europe’s complete prices below Scenario 1 to €1.2–1.6 trillion.
This alone already exceeds what the EU at the moment spends in complete on supporting Ukraine – and this calculation doesn’t even embody potential infrastructure destruction within the Baltic or Scandinavian theatres, nor new waves of refugees.
👉 Original article and longer model on HVG
🤝 This article was written as a part of a cross-border European journalistic collaboration throughout the EU Neighbours East challenge
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